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Rules (of Bidding) to Generate Equal Stated Profits     
- An Axiomatic Approach - 
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Although one may hope to achieve equality of stated profits without 
enforcing it, one may not trust in such voluntary equality seeking and 
rather try to impose rules (of bidding) guaranteeing it. Our axiomatic 
approach is based on envy-free net trades according to bids which, 
together with the equality requirement, characterize the first-prize auction 
and fair division game. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Equality of profits is often a major concern of cooperating parties like, for 
instance, of firms, other organizations, or private persons engaged in joint 
ventures. The problem we study is not how to share profits equally during the 
joint venture but rather to induce equal profits when terminating it. For this 
situation, we assume that an indivisible object, e.g. the joint venture firm but also 
any other unique indivisible commodity like a house or a painting, has to be 
allocated to one of several parties who state “profits” by bidding. 
 
The rules of bidding thus have to determine for all possible bid vectors who 
“wins” the object and what the “winner” must pay. In case of an auction, the 
payment goes to the seller who is not a member of the bidder group for which we 
want to guarantee equality of stated profits. In fair division conflicts where the 
bidders collectively own the object what the “winner” pays are the monetary 
compensations for the non-winning bidders. 
 
From imposing envy-freeness of net trades according to bids (Güth, 1986), it 
follows that the winner is the highest bidder and that the price must be in the 
interval of the second-highest and highest bid. In case of fair division conflicts, 
the “price” is the sum of equal monetary compensations. Additionally requiring 
equal stated profits of all bidders uniquely determines the price rule asking the 
winner to pay a price equal to his own bid. The two axioms together thus 
characterize the first-price auction and fair division game. 
 
 
2. Axiomatic  analysis 
 
Let  { } 1,..., Nn = with integer  2 n ≥  denote the group of bidders iN ∈  and assume 
some indivisible valuable object which 
•  in case of an auction is owned by an external seller offering to sell the 
object to one of the bidders in N 
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•  in case of a fair division conflict, it is collectively owned by the group N of 
bidders who, however, want to sell the object to one of them, e.g. to 
terminate a joint venture. 
As usual for the legal rules, e.g. those of public procurement auctions (see 
Gandenberger, 1961, for some historical account) or those for dissolving joint 
ventures and settling inheritance and divorce conflicts, we assume bidders iN ∈  
to submit monetary bids  () 0 i b ≥  declaring their idiosyncratic evaluation of the 
object. In the following we will refer to these bids  i b  as the stated evaluations of 
the object by bidders i and speak of equality of stated profits when the net trades 
as evaluated by bids are equally profitable. 
 
The rationale for guaranteeing equality of stated rather than true profits is that 
true evaluations are nearly always private information what renders guaranteeing 
equal true profits impossible. One might, of course, impose incentive 
compatibility to induce truthful bidding. But this requires rather special rules with 
serious drawbacks (see, for instance, Fehl and Güth, 1987, for auctions and, 
more generally, Wilson, 1987, asking for robust mechanisms whose rules do not 
depend on “volatile” parameters like private beliefs). 
 
What the rules of bidding have to determine is for all possible bid vectors 
() 1,..., n bb b =  
•  who “wins”, i.e., the winner  ( ) wb N ∈ , and 
• what () wb has to pay, i.e., the price  ( ) p b  paid to the seller in case of an 
auction and the monetary compensations  ( ) i tb which  ( ) wb pays to all 
non-winners  ( ) , iN iw b ∈≠ , in case of a fair division conflict. 
We determine these rules axiomatically by imposing 
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Axiom 1:  According to their bids, i.e., to their stated evaluations, no bidder 
iN ∈  prefers the net trade of another bidder  , j Nj i ∈ ≠ , to his own 
one. 
 
Clearly, in case of a fair division conflict, axiom 1 requires 
() () () : ij tb tb t b ==  
for all  , ij N ∈  with  () , ij wb ≠  and for all bid vectors b . To jointly characterize  
the rules of bidding for auctions and fair division conflicts, we also define a “price”  
for fair division conflicts via 
() :( ) p pn t b = for all bid vectors b . 
Thus, envy-freeness in the sense of axiom 1 requires 
() () 0 wb bp b −≥  for  () wb and 
0( ) i bp b ≥−  for all iN ∈  with  () iw b ≠  
in case of an auction as well as 
()
1
() () / wb
n
bp b p b n
n
−
−≥  for  () wb and 
1
() / () i
n
p bnb p b
n
−
≥−  for all iN ∈  with  () iw b ≠  







 in case of an  
auction, resp. fair division conflict yields 
() () wb i bp b b ≥≥  for all iN ∈  with  () iw b ≠ . 
 
According to axiom 1, the rules thus allocate the object to the highest bidder
1  
who has to pay a “price” in the (closed) interval of the second-highest and  
highest bid. The ambiguity of the pricing rule  () p b , allowed by axiom 1, can be  
resolved by additionally imposing 
 
                                                 
1 In case of more than one highest bidder, anonymity would require to determine each of them with equal 
probability as the winner  () wb N ∈  what, in the following, will be neglected. 
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Axiom 2:   According to their bids, i.e., to their stated evaluations, 
´ the  stated  profits of all bidders iN ∈  are equal. 
 
In case of an auction, all non-winners iN ∈ , () iw b ≠ , do not exchange anything,  
i.e., have net trades evaluated by 0. Requiring a net trade with 0-stated  
profit also for  () wb, thus requires 
() () 0 wb bp b −=  or  () () wb bp b = . 
Similarly, for fair division conflicts the requirement 
()
1
() () / wb
n
bp b p b n
n
−
−=  or  () () wb bp b =  
determines the first-price rule  () () wb bp b =  for all bid vectors b . 
Proposition:  For auctions as well as for fair division conflicts, axiom 1 and 
2 together imply to allocate the object to the highest bidder 
at the price of his bid, i.e., according to the first-price rule. 
 
General truth telling, i.e., bids expressing true evaluations, guarantees thus both,  
envy-freeness of net trades and equality of profits for all bidders, not only in view  
of stated but also in view of true evaluations. In case of auctions, our axiomatic  
approach could be more relevant for procurement by public authorities or  
agencies, so-called public tender auctions, than for private sales auctions where 
 the seller may prefer revenue maximizing rules (e.g. Riley and Samuelson,  
1981; Mascin and Riley, 1984) over procedurally fair ones. This may be different  
when private sellers employ auction houses or (Internet) platforms which may  
feel obliged to procedural fairness to attract many bidders. In case of fair  
division conflicts, procedural fairness seems to be of utmost importance and is  
often legally implemented to resolve conflicts when the parties cannot agree  
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3. Discussion 
 
The two axioms, applied above, define fair rules (of bidding) without necessarily 
claiming that this implies fair allocation results as, for instance, judged by the 
bidders’ true rather than stated evaluations where even that would be guaranteed 
if bids were truthful. Imposing incentive compatibility (in the sense of dominance 
solvability) instead of axiom 2 would have characterized the second-price auction 
(Vickrey, 1961) and implied an impossibility result for fair division conflicts (Güth, 
1986). 
 
The rules (of bidding) which we have derived above are not yet complete in the 
sense of yielding well-defined games. To complete the rule specification, one 
would have to include true evaluations and what bidders know about the true 
evaluations of their co-bidders (see Güth and van Damme, 1986, and for 
experimental studies Güth, 1986; Güth et al., 2002 and 2003; Becker and 
Brünner, 2009). 
 
Axiom 1 is rather universally satisfied what renders it very convincing. One rare 
exception is the hiring of, e.g. academic teachers in the tradition of Continental 
Europe. Here a position is announced for a fixed honorarium  ( ) 0 h >  without 
paying attention to competition on the supply side. If, for instance, two equally 
qualified candidates X and Y with outside option payoffs x and  y , respectively, 
satisfying  0 hxy >>> would apply, each of them would envy the net trade of the 
other when the other is hired, earning the honorarium h. Envy-freeness would 
require to lower the honorarium so that x hy ≥≥ applies, i.e., the honorarium is 
reduced to a range where only candidate Y prefers his being hired to his outside 
option  y . 
 
Equality is postulated by equity theory (Homans, 1961) in situations where all 
bidders iN ∈  have contributed equally to the success, e.g. of a joint venture, and 
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is seen as an important goal which, however, may be conflicting with own profit 
maximization according to the concept of inequity aversion (e.g. Bazerman, 
Löwenstein and Thomson, 1989; Bolton, 1991; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr 
and Schmidt, 1999). The (experimental) confirmation so far relies on small group 
interaction without stochastic uncertainty, e.g. in the sense of private information. 
With private information people may not be equality seeking, as judged by their 
true evaluations, but may rather try to guarantee only equality of stated profits. 
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